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Most cloud security incidents are initially detected 
by automated monitoring tools. Because they are tuned 
to minimize the risk of false-negative errors, these tools 
cast a wide net of suspicion. Depending on the scale of 
the incident, the automated tools may implicate rather 
long lists of VMs and containers. Hence, this study 
proposes a new intermediate step aimed at reducing 
the number of VMs and containers awaiting forensic 
investigation.  
The proposed method renders two-dimensional 
visualizations of container contents and virtual 
machine disk images. The visualizations can be used to 
fingerprint container / VM contents, pinpoint instances 
of embedded malware, and find modified code. The 
proof of concept is evaluated in a pilot study. The 
results indicate that it shows promise. Implications and 
future research directions are also described.    
 
1. Introduction  
 
Containers and virtual machines are the building 
blocks of cloud computer systems. They host the 
applications and data which collectively provide 
scalable, on-demand services to users on a global basis. 
The integrity of containers and virtual machines (VM) 
is paramount. If the containers and VMs providing a 
service are not trustworthy, then the cloud is irrelevant.  
Because of their pivotal role in cloud computing, 
containers and VMs are frequently targeted for attack 
[1]. Attackers may attempt an infiltration in order to 
steal or corrupt data, install rootkits, or deploy 
malware. If successful, they can use the container as a 
springboard for data exfiltration, disrupting hosted 
services, or launching attacks against other cloud 
resources [2].  
A large number of VMs, containers, and other 
resources could be implicated in a cloud security event. 
Automated monitoring systems cast a wide net when it 
comes to identifying assets which could be involved in 
an incident. Cloud operations team often end up 
placing long lists of VMs and containers in quarantine 
until they can be cleared [3]. The cloud hosting 
provider has to perform a forensic investigation on 
every implicated asset. This is often costly and time-
consuming. They may even be forced to ask clients 
resolve the security issues on their own (see Figure 1).  
   
 
Figure 1. Limits of  public cloud forensics 
 
Neither solution is desirable. Cloud clients may not 
have the ability to perform their own investigation. 
Furthermore, cloud client still have to pay for hosting 
but do not enjoy the full use of their quarantined VMs 
and containers.  
Hence, this research proposes a new intermediate 
step between automated analysis and digital forensic 
investigation. This step would allow cloud operations 
teams to perform rapid analysis and adjudication of 
VMs and containers. This would reduce the number of 
assets which require forensic analysis.  
The proposed new step introduces a new method 
for out-of-band investigation of containers and VMs. 
Out-of-band inspection is the process of collecting data 
from outside of the element being investigated. This 
reduces the possibility of perturbations of potential 
evidence. It uses a novel approach for directly 
accessing the container file or VM disk image and 
interpreting the contents.  
The proposed method renders two-dimensional, 
colorized visualizations of the bytes contained in the 






Figure 2. Visualizing container files and VM disks 
 
VM disk or container file. Bytes are read from file 
and passed through a one-way privacy preserving hash 
and then assigned an ASCII color based on byte value. 
They are then transposed onto a PNG file of fixed 
width and variable length (Figure 2, below). The 
resulting visualization is intended to be interpreted by 
members of the operations teams. It provides insights 
into the contents of containers and VMs.  
The proposed step is designed to provide a rapid 
response to cloud-based incidents. With modest 
classification thresholds, it could reduce the number of 
assets requiring forensic analysis. This would reduce 
operational costs and increase customer satisfaction.  
A proof-of-concept test of the proposed new step is 
evaluated. The results indicated that it shows promise 
and merits additional development.  
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as 
follows: the next section contains the background. It 
describes existing methods for forensically analyzing 
containers and virtual machines and introduces the 
basics of visualization. The conceptual development 
section follows the background. It describes the 
proposed method and the expected benefits. The 
process of testing and comparison described in the 
evaluation section. The results of the tests are 
described next. Implications and future research are 
then discussed. Finally, concluding comments are 
shared.  
 
2. Background  
 
This section provides background information on 
three topics. First, it reviews existing methods for 
forensically analyzing containers and virtual machines. 
Second, it surveys current visualization techniques. 
Third, it reviews related research. 
 
2.1. Container and VM forensics 
  
Both containers and virtual machines provide a 
means for software isolation, and are an essential 
components of any cloud based-environment. With 
containers, the abstraction is performed at the 
operating system level [4]. Multiple containers can 
share a single host operating system. Each container 
has one or more applications and their associated 
libraries, configuration files, and subdirectory 
structures [5]. One of the most common container 
platforms is Docker. Containers have the benefit of 
being lightweight. They typically provide efficiencies 
over and above their VM counterparts.  
For their part, VMs offer more isolation, greater 
security, and cross-platform functionality [6]. They 
make use of hardware-level abstraction. Each VM 
includes a complete operating system, software, and 
host applications. Because they replicate the operating 
system, they are more costly in terms of performance. 
Although containers and VMs differ in a number of 
respects, at a fundamental level they both provide a 
means for isolating and maintaining software that 
someone else may own [7]. In this sense, the methods 
of their forensic analysis tend to overlap. Some of the 
approaches to accessing and investigating a container 
are also used on virtual machines [6]. This is most 
evident in legally-motivated investigations.  
Digital forensics were historically driven by the 
need to support judicial proceedings. A high degree of 
importance was placed on following process, 
maintaining a chain of custody, etc. [8]. However, 
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current analyses may also be aimed at informing inter-
organizational processes and workflows. Here the 
emphasis is on getting enough information to support 
internal decision making while not violating terms of 
service. Hence, there are two approaches to container 
and VM forensics: the first is herein referred to as the 
legal approach while the second will be called the 
introspective approach because it uses interrogative 
techniques.  
The legal approach is a formalized process which 
involves creating demonstrable links between points of 
interest without modifying the original data. The 
purpose is to provide evidence which conforms to the 
practices and standards of a respective legal system [9].  
This can involve several different issues, which were 
partially discussed in O’Shaughnessy and Keane [10], 
whose discussions dealt with data collection within a 
cloud environment.  Two key issues covered were the 
chain of custody and multi-jurisdictional-legislation. 
Chain of custody concerns with who had access to data 
that will be used as evidence; given a given cloud can 
span multiple geographical locations and be collocated 
with other user’s data on a rack of servers, legally 
obtaining the data, without crossing other users’ rights 
can be challenging.  This is even more complicated 
when geographical location crosses jurisdictions 
Once that issue is resolved and the raw files are 
collected and duplicates are obtained, the forensic 
investigator can proceed at a pace which allows for 
appropriate diligence and care. The investigator begins 
by importing a toolset which allows for brute force 
password cracking [11]. After access is obtained, the 
file and directory structure is reconstructed onto the 
desktop of the workstation. The files and data of 
interest are then gleaned.  
This time-tested approach is reliable. It provides a 
high degree of accuracy in file classification and 
anomaly detection [12]. However, it is not particularly 
time-sensitive. This approach is generally performed 
post-hoc. However, it is not fast enough for real-time 
operations. Too much time is lost in gaining access to 
the container or VM. During a cyber event, the 
operations team needs information as quickly as 
possible.  
The introspective approach consists of a family of 
techniques which uses introspection in order to gain 
insights into the processes being executed within [13]. 
Although this approach was originally developed for 
virtual machines, parallel techniques and tools can be 
used within the container space as well [4]. 
Introspection techniques monitor the runtime processes 
and applications currently running in a virtual machine 
or container. They give visibility into the software 
being executed [14]. Introspection has been used in the 
past to fingerprint the software running on a container 
or virtual machine [6].  
Introspection can be achieved via a few different 
means.  Dykstra and Sherman [15] developed FROST, 
which is a set of tools that operated upon OpenStack, a 
cloud operating system [16]. FROST permits users to 
retrieve an copy of virtual disks associated with that 
user’s virtual machines; it also checked API requests 
and OpenStack firewall logs. One drawback is the tools 
are built on-top of OpenStack and integrated into the 
Horizon web-based user interface for OpenStack; 
hence the stack was directly tied to OpenStack.  
Another OpenStack-based approach was proposed 
by Saibharah and Greethaukumari [17] who used 
existing tools already available within the platform. 
They built a framework based off of snapshots of both 
random-access memory and disk images, as well as 
working through logging systems native to OpenStack. 
Finally, the researchers extended their framework to 
incorporate network forensics. The evaluations showed 
that evidence could be obtained for several different 
types of attacks on a cloud environment. 
Graziano et al. [18], unlike the previous two 
studies, assumed that the forensics teams did not know 
what hypervisor was being used.  Hence, they 
exploited physical memory dumps of a given machine 
to identify (a) if a hypervisor is present and (b), if 
present, what type of hypervisor was being used.  The 
concept was based upon the idea that hypervisors 
virtualization of memory changed how that memory is 
allocated. 
Casalicchio and Percibali [19] focused specifically 
on analyzing containers. They wanted to determine if a 
battery of tools, that collected CPU and Disk I/O 
workloads, captured the same information. They 
determined different tools present similar but not 
completely equivalent results. Rather than compare 
tools, Watts et al. [20] examined whether Prometheus 
[21], an open-source introspection tool, using default 
metric collection, could be used to determine if a 
container was infected or not during an investigation. 
The results indicated it could be, but the authors noted 
an automated solution, versus manual inspection, 
would be desirable. 
One drawback of the previous efforts was the 
concept the assumption that the underlying system was 
sound; that is, that no tampering or inconsistent 
information had been introduced.  Thrope et al. [22] 
did not make this assumption, rather, they built a 
virtual machine profiler model and a log auditor to 
detect and report errors and inconsistencies within the 
logs; the assumption is attackers could introduce 
deletions and modifications to the logs. Results 
indicated that the system could find inconsistencies 
within the log, indicating that they had been modified. 
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Shropshire [23] approached the problem of 
detecting anomalous behavior within a compromised 
cloud system from a hardware prospective. 
PowerCheck was developed, which identified 
discrepancies by comparing the system state 
parameters with parameters based upon server energy 
consumption. Tests validated the idea of secondary 
system measures as legitimate integrity monitors. 
Unlike the previous studies. Stelly et al. [24] 
focused on demonstrating the scalability of forensic 
analysis of containers.  They developed a toolkit 
entitled SCARF toolkit that was shown to obtain high 
throughput in processing when tested upon two 
different clusters running containers. 
 
2.2. Visualization techniques 
 
The field of visualization encompasses a number of 
techniques for interpreting data. These techniques 
range in complexity from simple bar charts and line 
graphs to x-y plots. Even more sophisticated 
techniques may be used if the data structures and 
relationships are highly complex. Visualizations can be 
classified along three dimensions: the data to be 
visualized, the visualization technique, and the 
interaction technique [25, 26]. 
 Visualizations may be based on one-dimensional 
data, two-dimensional data, multi-dimensional data, 
text or hypertext, graph or relational data, hierarchical 
data, or audio/visual signals [27]. In general, one 
dimensional data are typically represented using 
histograms or visualization similar to pie charts. Two 
dimensional data may be visualized with scatter plots 
and line graphs. Multi-dimensional data is often 
associated with icon, dense-pixel, and geometric 
transformations. Regardless of data type, some 
preprocessing is usually performed in order to identify 
complexities such as missing elements, trends, 
conversions, and skewing tendencies. Following 
normalization, the most appropriate visualization 
technique is selected. 
 
2.3. Related Research 
 
Several studies have used the concept of 
visualization for security, performance, and integrity 
monitoring.  
Perrig and colleagues developed a method for hash 
visualization [28]. The visualizations were designed to 
be used instead of authentication tokens or strings. It 
was theorized that humans are better equipped to 
compare images than identify differences in long 
alphanumeric key strings.  
A study by Lee et. al. [29] investigated malicious 
codes using visual pattern analysis. In this study, a 
number of malicious software packages were 
visualized so that pattern matching algorithms could 
detect repeated features. This study laid the 
groundwork for a number of follow-up studies in 
malware analysis. 
A study conducted by Nataraj et. al. [30] examined 
the usefulness of analyzing software binaries as 
images, with the goal of automatically determining 
which binaries were malware. In that study, binaries 
were converted into grey-scale images. Image 
processing techniques were used to extract texture 
information, which was then feed into a classifier, 
which would then determine if the binary was safe or 
malicious. Various studies expanded upon the 
classification of images of software by showing 
texture-based classification was faster than dynamic 
analysis [31], creating noise-tolerate features from 
images [32], and finally by creating a full-fledge 
system based on content-based search [33]. However, 
all these approaches are based on file-level analysis.  
A project conducted by Jain et. al.  [34] created a 
visual image of Android binaries in order to study the 
effect of optimization and obfuscation techniques; the 
latter is often used to hide the fact that malicious code 
has been developed. The inspection was done 
manually, and has aided by the fact Android binaries 
are generally structured; hence, color coding 
techniques based on the structure were utilized to 
improve understanding.  This work was expanded to 
include predicting what type of obfuscation was being 
used; accuracy of nearly 90% were achieved [35]. 
A number of visualizations techniques have been 
used for network forensics and security [36]. Directed 
and undirected graphics, radials, and hub-and-spoke 
networks can be constructed from packet flows to 
support easier interpretation among human analysts. 
Additionally, new generations of network visualization 
incorporate clustering and random walks.  
   
3. Conceptual Development  
 
Most cloud security incidents are initially detected 
by automated monitoring tools. Because they are 
generally tuned to minimize the risk of false-negative 
errors, these tools cast a wide net of suspicion. 
Depending on the scale of the incident, the automated 
tools may implicate rather long lists of VMs and 
containers. Typically, these assets have to wait in 
quarantine until they can be forensically investigated 
and cleared. This could anger clients and increase 
operational costs for the cloud service provider.  
Hence, this study proposes a new intermediate step 
aimed at reducing the number of VMs and containers 
awaiting investigation. The proposed method uses 
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visualization techniques to quickly interpret the 
contents of VMs and containers and clear assets which 
are unrelated to the incident.  
The proposed new method is out-of-band, meaning 
it is undetectable to the container or VM being 
investigated. The container or VM is inspected from a 
peering point within the hypervisor or container 
engine. Furthermore, there is no impact on container 
performance.  
The proposed new method is designed to balance 
speed with reliability. Further, it does not rely on brute 
force password cracking. Additionally, it is highly 
interactive. An investigator can manipulate the 
visualization associated with the proposed method in 
order to make rapid inferences.  
The visualization methods support investigation of 
the functionality of software housed in containers and 
virtual machines. It enables the investigator to 
fingerprint the contents of a container, identify 
anomalous software, and detect content or media 
which might be illegal.  
The workflow is as follows: when suspicious 
activity is reported or detected within the cloud, 
monitoring software traces the activity over the 
network back to a subset of potential offenders. These 
containers or virtual machines may fall within the same 
subnet, broadcast domain, or reside in the same 
physical host or data center.  
Each suspicious container or VM is traced from its 
host back to the location where its container file or VM 
disk image is permanently stored. Here the proposed 
visualization techniques would be used to create a 
PNG image file for each file or disk image. The PNG 
image contains a two dimensional visualization of the 
raw contents of the container file or VM disk.  
Once the visualizations are collected, members of 
the operations team perform inspections in order to 
identify their software contents. The team then looks 
for anomalous modifications, rootkits, other instances 
of malware, and illicit content. With little training it is 
possible to make meaningful inferences from the 
visualizations. For instance, contrasting visualizations 
of the same container over time will yield a time-
ordering of changes in its contents (See Figure 3).  
Assets which are clearly not part of an ongoing 
cyber incident could be returned to production. This 
would reduce time-in-quarantine, please clients, and 
reduce forensic backlogs.  
 
 
Figure 3. Detecting changes in container / VM contents 
 
As described in the introduction, the process for 
creating each visualization is as follows: each byte 
from the container file or VM disk is sampled and 
run through a one-way privacy-preserving hash 
function. Each hashed byte is then mapped to 1 of 
256 ASCII color values. Each color value is used to 
shade the corresponding pixel in the visualization 
PNG file.  
Interpretation of the visualizations requires some 
degree of contextualization. In many cases it is useful 
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to compare container or VM visualizations against 
labeled segmentations of other images. This allows 
the inspector to identify various segments within the 
visualization of interest. For instance, such 
comparisons can be made to identify operating 
systems, libraries and specific applications. Once a 
software component is identified it can be contrasted 
against other visualizations of trusted instances of the 
same component. Any unexplained differences would 
be considered anomalies. 
It is predicted that the proposed visualization 
method will result in more accurate and timely 
identification of container/ VM contents. It is further 
expected to result in more accurate and timely 
detection of anomalies within identified software 
components.   
 
4. Evaluation  
 
A proof-of-concept evaluation was performed to 
assess to the efficacy of the proposed new method. 
Specifically, the evaluation sought to answer two 
questions:  
 How fast is the proposed method relative to other 
investigative techniques? 
 How reliable is the proposed method relative to 
other investigative techniques?   
 
4.1. Experimental Groups 
 
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the test 
group or the control group. Test group subjects used 
the proposed visualization method to analyze 
containers and VMs during a simulated cyber event. 
The proposed visualization method was 
operationalized for this experiment as a SaaS 
platform (see Figure 4).  
The platform was custom built for this research 
using a combination of python 3 Anaconda libraries 
for creating visualizations and JavaScript on the front 
end for user interaction. It has modules for comparing 
visualizations, identifying software components 
within visualizations, and detecting anomalous areas 
within known software.  
The control group used the contemporary method 
to analyze containers and VMs associated with the 
same scenario. This group used Kali Linux for brute 
force password cracking, data extraction, and 
timeline reconstruction.  
 
 





A total of 42 individuals assisted in evaluation of 
the proposed new methodology. Individuals were 
either graduate students who had recently completed 
a course on cloud computing, digital forensics, or 
operating systems or were recent graduates. To 
overcome biases, unfair experience, and any pre-
existing familiarity with commercial toolsets, only 
individuals with no prior professional experience in 
digital forensics were included in the study. 
Individuals were evenly distributed between the 
control group and the test group. Each subject 
completed a 45 minute online training session which 
described how to use the forensic tool associated with 
their group. Subjects then completed a short online 




The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the 
relative speed and accuracy of the proposed 
visualization method. Each subject was asked to 
assess a large number of cloud-based assets during a 
limited period of time. As previously indicated, half 
of the subjects used the visualization method and half 
used traditional techniques.   
The analysis includes fingerprinting the software 
in the suspicious containers / VMs, identifying 
anomalous software, and correctly classifying 
individual instances as benign or infected.  
Subjects logged into a subset of a private, IaaS 
(Infrastructure-as-a-Service) cloud which was 
constructed for the purposes of this experiment. Each 
subset contained the analytical tool associated with 
the subject’s assigned and replications of the same 
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container and VM instances. During their analysis, 
participants recorded their findings conclusions for 
each container or VM instance they analyzed within a 
web-based form. The form consisted for 30 sections – 
one for each container or VM. There was a space to 
record the software inventory and denote the absence 
or presence of anomalous code for each instance.  
 
4.4. Means of Comparison 
 
Some 15 Docker containers and 15 ESX-based 
VMs were included. The 15 containers were clones 
of a single MEAN (mongoDB, express, angular, 
node.js) stack web application. The MEAN stack was 
chosen because although it is widely used, it is of 
sufficient complexity to warrant careful forensic 
analysis. The latest stable version of each of the 
MEAN stack elements was used in the image. Of the 
15 containers 5 were infected with a rootkit which 
consists of modified code in the node.js script and a 
compressed key string in the angular library (see 
Figure 5). 
The 15 VMs were clones of a single LAMP 
(Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP) stack web 
application. The LAMP stack was selected because it 
provides a balance between familiarity and 
complexity. The Ubuntu 18.04 Linux flavor was 
used, along with the latest stable versions of the other 
elements. (The study participants all reporting having 
at least an introductory level of Linux proficiency.) 
The stack was sufficiently large enough to require a 
careful investigation. Of the 15 VMs 8 were infected 
with a rootkit which modified code within the glibc 
library and stored compressed malware in the 
MySQL database. 
Individuals were scored across two key metrics: 
software fingerprinting accuracy and adjudication 
accuracy. Fingerprint accuracy is defined as the 
correct classification of each software component 
within an instance. One point was awarded for 
correctly identifying each software component. For 
instance, for a container, one point would be awarded 
for identifying each MEAN component (and the 
node.js code base) for a total of five points per 
container. 
Similarly, seven points were available for each of 
the main components of a LAMP VM. Adjudication 
accuracy is the accuracy with which one correctly 
classifies a container or VM as benign or infected. 
One point is awarded for each correct classification 
while a point is deducted for making an incorrect 
classification. Overall, a total of 180 software 
fingerprinting points and 30 adjudication points were 




Figure 5. Comparing Container Visualizations 
 
5. Results  
 
Following the completion of the tests, the 
demographic data and test results were imputed into a 
spreadsheet for further analysis. The demographics 
indicate that the subjects skewed towards a younger 
age and gender skewed towards male. These data are 
illustrated in Table 1 (below). To compare the 
performance of the proposed forensic method against 
the standard method, a series of T-tests of significant 
differences were completed.  
The first test compared relative performance at 
fingerprinting. The results of this test are shown in 
Table 2 (below). The results indicate that the test 
group earned significantly more points for 
fingerprinting than the control group. This is likely 
because once the individuals in the test group learned 
to visually recognize specific software components in 
the first few visualizations they only needed to 
procure visualizations of the other instances to make 
quick comparisons. On average, members of the test 
group blueprinted 12 containers and 4 VM instances 
(for an average of 88 points) while the control group 
inspected 5 containers and 1 VM (37 points on 
average). 
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It appeared that the control group did not suffer in 
terms of fingerprinting accuracy. Of the images they 
analyzed, their accuracy was either on par or above 
the level of the test group. However, they were 
limited in their ability to project their acquired 
insights across the domain. The traditional approach 
is costly in terms of the time consumed acquiring 
access credentials for each instance. Further, it does 
not provide a single snapshot of the software 
contents. This has to be determined manually for 
each instance.  
A second t-test of significant differences was 
conducted to assess adjudication accuracy (see Table 
3). This is the extent to which a container or a VM is 
correctly classified as containing suspicious software. 
Although there were significant differences, the gap 
was somewhat less dramatic. The test group earned 
an average 12 points while the control group earned 4 
points on average.  
Members of the test groups did not have to wait 
for access the containers or VMs. Hence they were 
able to inspect more instances in the same period of 
time. On a per-instance basis, it appears that the 
accuracy rates are relatively equivalent between 
groups. The test and control groups averaged a 
classification rate of approximately 68% and 71%, 
respectively. Neither approach is conclusively more 
accurate than the other. 
To sum, the results of the tests indicate that the 
proposed visualization method outperforms the 
contemporary methods in terms of the speed and 
accuracy of software inventorying and adjudication. 
 
Age 
18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
19 18 4 1 0 0 
Gender 
Male Female Other    
27 15 0    
Ethnicity 
White Black Hispanic Asian Am. Indian Other 
28 3 0 11 0 0 
Table 1. Demographics 
 
 
 Levene’s Test t-test for Equality of Means 














4.41 40 .000 51 6 49.13 52.87 
Equal variance 
not assumed 
5.01 38.14 .000 51 6 49.98 53.54 
Table 2. t-Test of Significant Differences at Fingerprinting 
 
 
 Levene’s Test t-test for Equality of Means 














2.98 40 .005 8 2.01 7.38 8.62 
Equal variance 
not assumed 
3.01 38.72 .005 8 2.01 7.42 8.68 
Table 3. t-Test of Significant Differences at Adjudication 
 
 
6. Implications and future research 
 
The proof-of-concept test described in the 
previous sections yields several implications. It 
appears that subjects using the visualization method 
could adjudicate more VMs and containers than 
subjects using traditional methods in the same time 
period without a significant increase in errors. During 
a massive cloud security incident it would be 
beneficial to use the proposed method in order to 
reduce backlogs of assets awaiting forensic analysis.   
Page 6404
Future research should focus on exploring the 
relationship between the granularity of the 
visualization, analytical speed, and classification 
accuracy. It is expected that down-sampled images 
allow for faster analysis although they increase the 
likelihood that subtle details will be missed. Further, 
future research should focus on automating the 
process of software blueprinting. Machine learning 
methods such as near-neighbor could be useful for 
classifying installed.  
 
7. Conclusions  
 
It is concluded that the proposed method of rapid 
incident response could of significant value when 
time is of short supply and/or a large quantity of 
containers or VMs must be evaluated. An additional 
analytical step between automated incident detection 
and forensic investigation could save considerable 
time and effort if it reduces investigation backlogs.  
The proposed method provides an out-of-band 
approach to investigating the contents of hosted 
instances. It uses a new visualization technique to 
display data which might be otherwise difficult to 
understand. In this case, the data represents raw bytes 
taken from cloud storage. This is a novel viewpoint 
which users could not ordinarily access or interpret.   
The proof-of-concept tests suggest that the 
proposed new step merits additional testing and 
development. Using the visualization tools, 
Individuals were able to successfully detect malware 
approximately 70% of the time. With more research 
and development this could rise even higher. Future 
combinations of visualizations with more advanced, 
intelligent forensics will likely provide even better 
results for cloud computer systems.  
 
8. Conclusions  
 
This work is supported in part by the National 
Science Foundation award IIP-1740434 and in part 
by the Industry Advisory Board of the Center for 
Advanced Research in Forensic Science. 
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